The applicants contended that the Tribunal failed to consider certain important matters and the country of origin information, and that the Tribunal erred in dealing with the matter of credibility in isolation from the country of origin information. The respondent contended that the Tribunal was not obliged to consider the country of origin information where an adverse credibility finding negates the need to consider such information.
The Court refused the relief sought, finding that while the principle in Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department a correct statement of principle, there are exceptional cases where a decision maker can reach a conclusion on the personal credibility of an applicant such that there could be no possible benefit derived from seeing whether the applicant’s story fits into a factual context in her country of origin. The Court stated that it must not fall into the trap of substituting its own view on credibility for that of the Tribunal as the latter is in the best position to assess credibility based on the observation and demeanour of an applicant; and that a Court will be reluctant to interfere in a credibility finding other than for the reason that the process by which the assessment of credibility has been made is legally flawed.
