RG v International Protection Appeals Tribunal & ors

EMNireland


RG v International Protection Appeals Tribunal & ors
Respondent/Defendant:International Protection Appeals Tribunal, Chief International Protection Officer, Minister for Justice, Ireland, and Attorney General
Court/s:High Court
Judgment Date/s:19 Dec 2023
Judge:Hyland N.
Category:Asylum
Keywords:Asylum, Dublin Regulation, Transfer Order
Country of Origin:Georgia
URL:https://www.courts.ie/acc/alfresco/8d2a1d66-9f1e-4000-94a0-51bedbd0e511/2023_IEHC_742.pdf/pdf#view=fitH
Geographic Focus:Ireland

Facts: RG was a Georgian man who sought international protection in Ireland. It was found that he had previously applied for international protection in France. A transfer decision was issued under the Dublin III Regulation 604/2013. He applied to the High Court seeking an injunction restraining his transfer or to stay on the transfer decision, pending ongoing judicial review proceedings. Under Article 29 of the Dublin III Regulation, where a state does not transfer the individual within six months of the acceptance of responsibility of the second state, the responsibility for the application reverts to the first state. In this case, it would revert back to Ireland. The respondents argued that granting an injunction/stay effectively pushes that period beyond six months and therefore determines the outcome of the proceedings.

Reasoning: In the High Court, Hyland J. held that if the Court were to place a stay on the transfer decision, this would not stop the six month time limit from running from the date of the IPAT decision. Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation provides for an effective remedy for applicants, and in Ireland, the IPAT is the designated appeals authority. An appeal in the IPAT has suspensive effect on the transfer decision and the running of the clock on the six month time limit. However, Hyland J. found that Article 27 does not provide a right to the suspensive effect in a further remedy, such as the judicial review pursued in the instant case. Indeed, Articles 27 and 29 were considered a self-contained regime of a remedy and time limits. Once a final decision is issued by the body appointed for the appeal, the six month time limit starts. While Member States can allow for judicial reviews, Hyland J. held that a Member State cannot interfere with the self-contained regime of Articles 27 and 29 and the time limits therein. Hyland J. recalled the purpose of the Dublin III regulation, which is to provide a simple and prompt system for determining Member State responsibility.

Whereas the applicant submitted that the Minister failed to engage in the submitted medical evidence in the case, Hyland J. held that the medical concerns were not of such a level as to put the applicant at risk of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on transfer to France and that there were no systemic concerns about France. It was held that the applicant could be transferred pending the outcome of judicial review proceedings. If the outcome of those proceedings were in favour of the applicant, they could then return to Ireland.

Decision: Hyland J. refused the application for an injunction and/or stay on the transfer of the applicant to France under the Dublin III Regulation.

Principles:Articles 27 and 29 of the Dublin III Regulation and the time limits set therein are a self-contained regime. While the first remedy must provide suspensive effect, further remedies, such as judicial review, do not.
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