An asylum applicant who is unable to submit any objective information to support his or her claim to fear persecution if returned to his or her country of origin is likely to be unable to make out a well-founded fear of persecution and, hence, an entitlement to a declaration of refugee status.

Rejection of an asylum applicant’s application partly on the erroneous basis that it was the same as an unsuccessful application made by another party, such as a spouse, will likely result in the negative decision being quashed, unless it is clear to the reviewing court precisely what weight was given by the decision-maker to it erroneous assessment of the claim.

Where an applicant has not sworn a grounding affidavit in accordance with the Rules of the Superior Courts, this will not necessarily result in the dismissal of the applicant’s proceedings. Where the error is attributable to the applicant’s legal representatives, the applicant will not be personally at fault and good and sufficient reason will exist to extend time in order to allow an affidavit to be sworn which complies with the Rules.

The absence of a sworn statement in the grounding affidavit to judicial review proceedings as to the facts relied upon in the statement of grounds will not necessarily lead to the  proceedings being dismissed for failure to comply with the Rules of the Superior Courts, whether on the grounds of delay or otherwise. The court will consider the merits of the application before deciding whether or not the applicant should be entitled to swear an affidavit which remedies the error.

Section 2 of the ECHR Act 2003 applies to a “court”, which term does not include the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. The Tribunal is, however, bound by s. 3 of the ECHR Act 2003 and is obliged to perform its functions in a manner compatible with the State's obligations under the ECHR’s provisions. To qualify as a refugee, an asylum applicant must come within a specific definition within the terms of the Refugee Act 1996. Claims for refugee status do not address constitutional or ECHR rights, and unsuccessful applicants are left in exactly the same position with regard to them as they had been before their application was determined. There is no interference with any constitutional or ECHR rights as a result of a refusal to recommend refugee status

Nonetheless, rights available to asylum applicants under the Constitution and the ECHR are applicable to the manner in which protection decision-makers like the Refugee Appeals Tribunal carry out their functions, but do not arise in terms of making an assessment on the applicant’s entitlement to refugee status.

No provision of Community law requires protection decision-makers to apply the provisions of the ECHR when taking protection decisions, save that the right to an adequate remedy contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights applies to the procedures whereby protection decisions are taken.

A protection decision-maker must ensure that any findings on credibility are unambiguous, so as to leave the applicant, and any reviewing court, in no doubt as to whether the decision-maker believed his claim or not. This is particularly so if it wishes to make a finding that internal relocation is available to the applicant.

An applicant who has been notified of the making of a s. 13(1) report by the Refugee Applications Commissioner has a duty, as an active participant in the asylum process, to take issue with any findings in it with which he disagrees on appeal to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. A genuine mistake in failing to do so may provide an unsuccessful applicant with an entitlement to apply for re-entry to the asylum process pursuant to s. 17(7) of the Refugee Act 1996.

It will not be a satisfactory explanation for delay in claiming asylum to argue that it was motivated by fear of deportation, relying on an unsubstantiated reference to an allegedly low refugee recognition rate.

In deciding whether or not the applicant, a Tutsi, was a refugee from the DRC and had a forward-looking fear of persecution there, the Tribunal was obliged to take into account the fact that she had suffered past persecution in that country, and the existence of a continuing undercurrent of prejudice and discrimination against Tutsis there, notwithstanding that her reasons for leaving the country had been held to lack credibility.